Last September, Congress played an important role in deflecting U.S. military action in Syria, paving the way for a diplomatic solution that is destroying Syria’s chemical weapons. Today, bipartisan leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lament the Obama administration’s “lack of strategy” to end the spreading violence. Yet, as the “Geneva 2” peace conference looms, the critics are not offering an alternative policy.
This is too bad since the administration’s current approach to Geneva 2 ignores the lessons of recent history and risks sabotaging its estimable goal of seeking a political solution.
Despite the reigning pessimism on Syria, it is worth recalling that, over the past two decades, political negotiations have ended comparably bloody conflicts in Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Mozambique and Sudan. In all these countries the combatants pragmatically negotiated new political systems after they became mired in costly military stalemates with no foreseeable prospects for victory. External powers, including the United States, played critical mediating roles and used leverage (including economic sanctions, military and aid withdrawals, diplomacy and financial incentives) to propel the negotiations forward. Similar circumstances exist or are rapidly developing in Syria. And while that country poses some special problems, such as an extremely divided opposition, there is no reason to believe they are insurmountable. In Burundi, Cambodia and Congo multiple armed groups were either brought into settlements or defeated.
Yet in the run-up to Geneva 2, the administration appears to have paid scant attention to these successes and how they were achieved. In their public statements, top officials have focused almost exclusively on a single objective for the conference: the formation, by “mutual consent” of the Government and Opposition, of a Transitional Governing Body with “full executive powers” in which “[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad and his close associates with blood on their hands will have no role . . . ”
In contrast, when transitional governments were created in Burundi, Cambodia, Congo and Sudan, their authority was closely linked to detailed agreements by the opposing parties on what the country was transitioning to. These included specific provisions on matters such as army reform, constitution-writing, political party recognition, election reform, human rights protection, cease-fire and troop demobilization, the insertion of U.N. or regional peacekeeping forces, foreign relations and economic reform. It’s simply not logical for combatants to relinquish real power to a transitional government unless they know where it will be taking them. Yet the administration’s proposed TGB floats alone.
Furthermore, there is a wide disjuncture between the administration’s requirement for Assad’s summary ouster and the present situation in Syria. While there can be no doubt that a politically viable and stable Syria is impossible so long as the Assad regime remains in power, the Opposition Coalition has only managed to achieve a stalemate. Furthermore, any abrupt dismissal of Assad would amplify his supporters’ fears of annihilation by their increasingly sectarian foes. Meanwhile, Assad’s main external backers, Russia and Iran, do not perceive an alternative vehicle for assuring their interests. Hence the U.S. and its allies’ demand for Assad’s exclusion from the TGB is a non-starter.
United We Dream protesters carry a mock coffin to the office of Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Monday, July 21, 2014, to hold one of their "funeral services for the Republican Party" due to GOP positions on immigration. The immigration reform group visited several other Senate Republican offices to hold similar funeral services.