“In retrospect, the die may have been cast for the November elections on May 19, 2010,” Republican consultant Brad Todd said, pointing to the day after the special election in Pennsylvania’s 12th district.
Todd, who is a close adviser to National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman Pete Sessions (Texas) and was heavily involved in the NRCC’s independent expenditure effort this cycle, argued that Democrats — and the national media — completely misread the meaning of that special election to fill the late Rep. John Murtha’s open seat.
After considering Todd’s case, it’s difficult to disagree with him.
Most pre-election and post-election analysis treated the special election in a conservative district carried by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) in the 2008 presidential election as a test case for the fall.
So when Mark Critz, a former aide to the late Democratic Congressman, defeated Republican businessman Tim Burns despite some polls showing the Republican with a narrow lead, Democrats took the result as irrefutable evidence that November wouldn’t be nearly as bad for the Democratic Party as some were predicting.
“We are going to maintain our majority,” House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (Md.) predicted after the results were in.
“Republicans test-drove their November strategy in Pennsylvania and it crashed,” Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman Chris Van Hollen (Md.) bragged.
“Where’s the wave?” Rep. Betsy Markey (D-Colo.) asked in this newspaper (“Democrats Breathing Easier Now,” May 20, 2010) just after the special election — and less than six months before her own re-election bid drowned in a gigantic Republican wave.
While I was much more cautious about the meaning of the results of the special election than most (“Pennsylvania Special: Only One Piece in Bigger Picture,” May 27, 2010), even I didn’t entirely dismiss the meaning of the May 18 special election results. I should have.
Democrats seem to have misinterpreted the Critz victory in a number of ways.
First, Democratic insiders concluded that talk about the GOP wave and voter dissatisfaction was exaggerated. Yes, people were unhappy, but that didn’t mean that they automatically were going to vote Republican, even in socially conservative, blue-collar areas.
If Republicans couldn’t defeat Critz in a special election, how could they possibly knock off Keystone State Democratic incumbents such as Reps. Kathy Dahlkemper, Paul Kanjorski and Jason Altmire, who also represent blue-collar Pennsylvania districts, or Rep. Steve Driehaus (Ohio), who owed his ’08 win to working-class Catholics?
Democrats also concluded that Critz’s victory proved they could win races late with tough enough attacks, heavy spending and a strong field program, no matter how unenthusiastic the party’s base voters appeared.
Third, Democratic insiders concluded that GOP pollsters had relied on overly rosy turnout scenarios and questionable polling assumptions in suggesting that Burns would win, and they dismissed Republican polls in the summer and fall as evidence that those same GOP consultants hadn’t learned their lessons.
And finally, Democrats figured that Burns’ loss proved that Republican attacks on Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) were ineffective and that she wouldn’t be a serious problem for the party’s House candidates in November.
In every case, Democrats were mistaken. Critz survived his re-election bid, but 52 Democrats were not so lucky on Election Day.
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