Dodd and Shelby were working on hot-button consumer-protection language, but their talks again broke down in February and Dodd asked Corker on Feb. 9 to negotiate on a broad range of issues.
In late-night, seven-day-a-week talks between the Senators and their staffs, we got to the 5-yard line, Corker told me.
But on March 10, Dodd backed off, pleading that his agreements with Corker were losing Democrats on his committee without guaranteeing any other GOP votes. Corker said he suspects the White House also influenced Dodd.
Dodd introduced his own bill, which took a pretty big leftward slant on consumer protection and grants of flexibility to regulators on whether to shut down troubled banks, Corker said.
Dodd said hed get his bill out of committee on a party-line vote the 1,300-page measure was approved in 21 minutes on March 22 and then try to negotiate a bipartisan bill before it went to the Senate floor.
That process was proceeding fitfully until Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) abruptly announced the measure would go to the floor this month presumably to embarrass a few Republicans into supporting the bill.
But all 41 Republicans signed a letter opposing it, suggesting they could defeat it with a filibuster. GOP leadership aides say this was a tactic to gain bargaining leverage.
Republicans attacked a provision for a $50 billion fund collected from big banks to be used to smoothly liquidate a troubled bank as a bailout.
Corker said removing the provision may clear the way for the administration to impose a tax on banks and require collection of close-down funds after a bank needs closing, perhaps in a recession.
But he said there are more important flaws in the bill especially the absence of underwriting standards for mortgages. Until 1982, he noted, borrowers were required to put at least 10 percent down and, in a default, lenders could demand full repayment of a loan.
Also, nothing in the bill will regulate housing giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, now in hock for $400 billion and having new mortgages dumped on them daily by the banks.
Corker and Warners major idea is still in the bill: If a big bank fails, the government will wind down these firms, sell off the assets, make sure the stockholders are absolute toast ... [and] make sure its so painful that nobody wants to go through this.
But would that really happen? If a huge institutions failure could bring down the whole economy and big banks, Corker admitted, are getting bigger by the day would government really close it down?
A future Treasury Secretary might decide its too dangerous, he acknowledged, but hed have to come to Congress to change the rules.
The biggest quandary of all emanating from the current crisis is how to get the smartest young people in America to get into productive work, instead of inventing synthetic financial instruments that have no social value.
Corker, who used to build shopping centers and office buildings that he could drive by with pride, admitted he had no answer to that. Who does, if bonuses at Goldman Sachs still run in the hundreds of millions of dollars?